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What has been proposed? Do the initiatives 
in relation to public sector performance 
promise significant savings? Detailed 
evaluation of these particular proposals 
would need research over time and a 
longer article than this, but some strands 
in the public management literature allow 
general observations that could be follow-
ed up at a later time. It is important to stress 
that this article1 accepts the government’s 
approach to fiscal consolidation. It does 
not enter into debates over the optimal 
level of government expenditure relative 
to national production or the rights 
and wrongs of reducing (or increasing) 
government spending in difficult 
economic times. It focuses instead on 
certain issues of system and organisational 
health and capacity in relation to public 
management as a result of the economic 
need to constrain government expenditure 
in the present circumstances. 
Some general lessons have already 
been learned that government would be 
wise to attend to. Further, new alternatives 
are becoming apparent, but any long-
term promise they have in terms of 
governance has yet to be worked through, 
and the short- to medium-term costs in 
Three recent speeches – by the finance minister to the 
Australia and New Zealand School of Government (English, 
2010) and to the Institute of Public Administration New 
Zealand (English, 2011), and the statement to Parliament 
delivered by the prime minister in February (Key, 2011) 
– draw an explicit link between government expenditure 
and New Zealand’s economic performance in weathering 
the global economic difficulties and the effects of the 
Christchurch earthquakes. Government expenditure is said 
to be too high and, given present trends, unsustainable. 
Strategies for making savings have been outlined. 
Government’s immediate concern is to return to budgetary 
surplus by the middle of this decade. However, according 
to the finance minister, ‘Public spending restraint is no 
temporary aberration. It is effectively permanent’ (English, 
2011).
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making them happen could be high. The 
trade-off between the short-term fiscal 
goals and the long-term goals of public 
sector capability and governance remains 
difficult to resolve.
Government intentions
Since coming to office in 2009, the 
National-led government has had six 
broad goals. They are: providing better and 
smarter public services; removing red tape 
and unnecessary regulation; investing in 
productive infrastructure; strengthening 
the tax system; lifting education and skills; 
and improving performance in science, 
innovation and trade (Key, 2011). Only 
the first of these will be dealt with in this 
paper. 
Government is concerned at recent 
trends in the New Zealand economy 
and the prospects for future growth, 
particularly given the effects of the 
global financial crisis of 2007–09 and the 
impacts of the Christchurch earthquakes. 
Overall government expenditure is said 
to be too high relative to GDP and there 
is concern that the present upwards 
trend cannot be sustained. It that sense, 
government seems to be defining the 
present economic circumstances as a 
classic ‘burning platform’ for change 
(Pollitt, 2011). It wants to ‘rebalance’ the 
economy and get the budget back into 
surplus by reducing government debt 
(acknowledged by government to be lower 
than that of several OECD countries but, 
like many, trending upwards since 2008: 
e.g. OECD, 2011, p.65). 
The rhetoric is familiar. ‘The previous 
government’s decision to massively ramp 
up spending in the 2000s left behind a 
large, structural deficit, and a bloated 
public sector that by 2008 was crowding 
out the competitive sectors of the 
economy’ (English, 2011). Government’s 
solution will be ‘building better outcomes 
from public services by being clear about 
New Zealanders’ priorities, by minimizing 
waste, scaling up what works, getting rid 
of what doesn’t, and generally focusing 
our investment on changes that bring 
results’ (Key, 2011, p.12).
As already noted, this article does not 
canvass the range of economic positions 
on optimal or acceptable levels of 
government expenditure or government 
debt relative to gross domestic product 
(GDP), and the benefits or otherwise 
of reducing or increasing government 
expenditure during difficult economic 
times (compare, for example, Kibblewhite, 
2011 with NZCTU, 2010; see also Hall, 
2010; Hood, Emmerson and Dixon, 
2009). Government’s position is accepted 
as is. Instead, the focus is on the possible 
effects of the changes government believes 
will improve productivity, economy 
and efficiency. According to the finance 
minister (English, 2011) these will come 
in three areas: clear priorities, achieving 
high-quality services and reducing waste.
Clear priorities
Government acknowledges its obligation 
to maintain the core functions of 
government but intends reducing 
government expenditure relative to the 
size of the New Zealand economy. Its 
general (if cryptic) position is that, ‘This 
is not a time we can afford to indulge in a 
whole lot of ‘nice-to-haves’… [that] come 
at the expense of necessities and at the 
expense of fairness to people with more 
need’ (English, 2011).
Insofar as policy priorities have 
been identified, they seem to be 
vulnerable children, welfare reform, 
education, housing, health and accident 
compensation, justice, law and order 
and public safety. Within that, allocation 
decisions ‘belong to the Government 
itself, consistent with its political mandate 
and accountability to the New Zealand 
public. So the Government will continue 
to make decisions about what to stop 
increasing, scale back, or stop doing 
altogether’ (English, 2011).
Achieving high-quality services
Government wants a modern, responsive 
public service that provides good value for 
money. In relation to service delivery, it 
expects to see the same level of innovation 
and responsiveness it claims marks the 
market economy. Public service agencies 
are said to be risk averse. In order for 
them to feel the keen edge of competition, 
contestability will be increased. More 
services will be provided by non-
government organisations, iwi and private 
sector providers.
Government plans to halt the recent 
increase in policy positions in Wellington 
(characterised as ‘bureaucracy’) and put 
more resources into front-line delivery, 
reducing the complexity confronting 
clients of services and making delivery 
seamless. This applies particularly 
to transactional services delivered to 
New Zealanders in their homes and 
businesses. Servicelink, an integrated 
delivery initiative being developed by the 
departments of Internal Revenue and 
Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Social 
Development, is held up as an example. 
Reducing waste
As reported in the 2011 Fiscal Strategy 
Report, the 2011 Budget projected savings 
of $5.2 billion over five years, directing $4 
billion of these savings to new initiatives, 
mostly front-line services in health and 
education. Some savings will come from 
reducing public sector operational costs, 
although most will come from adjustments 
to the policy framework, plus changes 
to KiwiSaver, Working for Families and 
student loans, the costs of which have 
recently escalated. The Treasury forecasts 
a return to fiscal surplus in 2014/15, with 
increasing surpluses in following years. 
Core Crown net debt is projected to peak at 
less than 30% of GDP and decline steadily 
beyond 2015.  It is believed that this will be 
achieved despite absorbing the cost of the 
Canterbury earthquakes (Treasury, 2011a). 
‘This is not a time we can afford to indulge in a whole 
lot of ‘nice-to-haves’… [that] come at the expense of 
necessities and at the expense of fairness to people 
with more need.’
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Several initiatives to rationalise public 
sector operational (not policy) costs are 
already well-established or getting under 
way. In early 2009 government imposed a 
cap on staff numbers in core government 
administration (Wellington) and gave 
priority to front-line service delivery staff. 
In August 2010 it also set up the Review of 
Policy Expenditure and Advice ‘to provide 
advice on the cost and quality of policy 
advice, as well as the alignment between 
policy expenditure and the Government’s 
priorities’.2 Attention is being focused on 
the high number of central government 
departments and ministries compared 
with other jurisdictions (for details see 
English and Ryall, 2011).3 Mergers have 
already commenced, although so far these 
have been relatively minor. The more 
general concern is ‘too many departments 
and ministries’, although government is 
stressing that structural change is only 
part of the answer. Work has already begun 
on rationalising back-office functions, 
common services and processes (Better 
Administrative and Support Services). 
Here, the ‘aggressive’ harnessing of 
technology and collaboration in provision 
of common and corporate services 
(e.g. between Treasury, the Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
and the State Services Commission) 
is expected to contribute significant 
savings. Overall, according to the finance 
minister, ‘This direction is likely to lead 
to fewer government agencies over time, 
to stronger governance across agencies 
where it is needed and for agencies to be 
more frequently based around common 
services and processes’ (English, 2011).
An important mechanism is tight new 
operating allowances at a maximum of 
$1.1 billion a year, reducing annually until 
2014/15 (Treasury, 2011a, p.43). Whilst 
setting definite goals and objectives in 
relation to savings government is co-
opting chief executives in identifying 
areas of interest and making these ‘key 
savings decisions’. The same applies to 
the so-called efficiency dividend. This is 
an annual claw-back but differentiated 
according to agency size. Organisations 
with total output expenses of over 
$200 million are being subject to a 6% 
efficiency dividend, with 3% applying 
to those under that line. This device 
is intended to drive ongoing efficiency 
and productivity improvements and to 
generate savings consistent with the four-
year budget plan (Treasury, 2011b).
Another mechanism is the 
Performance Improvement Framework 
(PIF). Described as ‘a joint central 
agency initiative to help senior leaders 
drive performance improvement across 
the State Services’,4 PIF was introduced 
in September 2010 as an evaluation of 
practices, systems and processes in each 
organisation. It is intended to work as 
much through self-reflection as external, 
expert-led assessment. In relation to PIF 
and the efficiency measures, government 
has praised chief executives for the work 
done so far. It continues to emphasise 
that it is ‘open to ideas and propositions 
from the public sector’ and that it ‘wants 
to work with public servants’ (English, 
2011).
Is it likely that these expenditure reduction 
strategies will achieve their goals?
More than 30 years ago Levine opened 
up questions about cutback management 
and organisational decline. His interest 
lay in the ‘great questions of political 
economy and the more earthly problems 
of managing public organizations’ 
(Levine, in Pandey, 2010). Throughout the 
1980s academics developed an interest in 
the field but then it waned. Recently, the 
onset of recession and then the global 
financial crisis of 2007–09 have re-ignited 
interest (Pandey, 2010 covers the history). 
Recent writers (e.g. Pandey, 2010; Pollitt, 
2010, 2011) note that public management 
research still offers few confirmed lessons 
for practice. The best that can be done, 
as Pandey (2010, p.564) suggests, is to ask 
‘somewhat inconvenient questions that 
get swept under the rug to accommodate 
seemingly more pressing issues’.  This 
article will proceed along these lines. It 
does not pretend to be comprehensive, 
discussing only certain issues that seem 
relevant to the present New Zealand 
situation. 
Savings strategies
Recent experience has emphasised that 
savings are ‘ferociously difficult’ to 
achieve (Pollitt, 2010, p.9). Even under the 
strong anti-government and privatisation 
agenda of Britain’s Thatcher government, 
aggregate spending was maintained. A 
recent comparison of cuts in Britain 
in the 1920s (led by the ‘Geddes Axe’ 
committee) and the 1970s–80s cutback 
periods undertaken by Hood, Emmerson 
and Dixon (2009) confirms the difficulty 
in modern times of achieving the same 
level of results as earlier. 
Part of the issue at present 
confronting governments is conflicting 
goals. The economic drivers for reducing 
government expenditure are considerable, 
requiring significant savings. Most 
government spending is on programmes 
with the proportion spent on public 
service operations being relatively small. 
The greatest potential for savings lies 
in cutting programmes, but this can 
be electorally unpopular. Reducing 
operational expenditure is more readily 
accepted, but the potential pool is small 
relative to aggregate expenditure and 
the level of savings required. Moreover, 
there are practical limits since a certain 
level of operations and capability must 
be maintained in order to ensure that 
government even functions. There is, in 
effect, a ‘bottom line’ for effectiveness.
Most government spending is on programmes with 
the proportion spent on public service operations 
being relatively small. The greatest potential for 
savings lies in cutting programmes, but this can be 
electorally unpopular. 
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So what approaches are available to 
governments? Pollitt has recently created 
a framework focused on broad strategies 
for managing ‘during financial austerity’ 
as shown in Table 1. 
The following discussion elaborates on 
the points in the table and adds others. 
Across-the-board cuts
Across-the-board cuts, what Pollitt refers 
to as ‘cheese-slicing’, have a long history. 
The attraction of this approach is that 
it can achieve significant reductions in 
expenditure in a relatively short period 
of time. It also appears comparatively fair 
in that all are expected to share equally in 
the burden. From a political perspective, 
a government can appear to be taking 
strong action in the face of crisis and avoid 
taking responsibility for cuts to particular 
programmes by leaving detailed cuts to 
public managers. 
Conversely, from a democratic 
perspective, this is problematic. Public 
managers making those decisions are 
not themselves directly accountable and 
may make managerial decisions which 
serve organisational or system rather 
than client interests. Further, across-the-
board cuts do not differentiate between 
well-managed, lean organisational units 
and poorly-managed ones with ‘fat’. This 
means that efficient and possibly effective 
programmes are treated the same as 
inefficient and/or ineffective ones that 
can absorb the reductions (the same 
can apply to efficiency dividends). In 
fact, cheese-slicing creates incentives for 
managers to ‘pad’ their organisations and 
programmes so that the next time that 
approach is applied they have reserves 
that can be cut (Pollitt, 2010). 
Centralised priority-setting 
This approach is the opposite of across-
the-board cuts. Those programmes that 
are known to be effective are retained and 
prioritised, whereas those that are not are 
either dropped or scaled back.
From both political and democratic 
perspectives, this approach has benefits. 
It appears to the electorate and the 
public service as more strategic (although 
not perhaps to providers and clients 
whose programmes are stopped). It 
leaves ministers in control and enables 
government to retain those programmes 
it favours or believes can be justified. The 
downside from the ministers’ perspective 
is that it makes them transparently 
responsible for choices that may be 
unpopular with significant parts of the 
electorate. It may not have been feasible 
to consult widely in their preparation 
and so the cuts will be a shock to those 
affected. There may be unanticipated 
consequences, in terms of impacts both 
on other programmes and on overall 
client outcomes (Pollitt, 2010).
The biggest difficulties with this 
approach, however, may be technical. 
Central to making it work is good 
and extensive evaluation of the range 
of programmes under consideration. 
According to the OECD (2009), not many 
governments have such information. In 
New Zealand, with so little evaluation 
conducted (Ryan, 2011), the situation 
is even worse. Equally, prioritisation 
tools such as matrices and filters are 
relatively under-developed (Pollitt, 2010). 
Otherwise, governments use political 
criteria such as electoral popularity, 
legitimately so since they will eventually 
be held accountable by citizens for their 
decisions. In terms of public value and 
societal well-being, however, there is no 
guarantee that the results will be effective 
or equitable.
Improving economy and efficiency
Several points are worth discussing under 
this heading, some of them relating 
to matters political, managerial and 
organisational rather than economic. 
Strikingly, many of them have an ‘if ’/’but’ 
character. As a result, ‘public management 
in difficult economic times’ begins to 
appear as more complex and ambiguous 
than reform advocates usually make out. 
Credibility and legitimacy
Economy and efficiency (including 
productivity) drives are obvious responses 
to fiscal problems. As Pollitt (2010) notes, 
however, they have been a constant fact of 
life in public sectors for the last 30 years 
and more. It is probable that most if not all 
Table 1: Three approaches to making savings
APPROACH ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
‘Cheese-slicing’ Sounds egalitarian (‘everyone 
must meet his share’). Ministers 
avoid directly choosing which 
programmes will be most hurt. 
Detailed decisions delegated 
to programme specialists who 
probably know what they are 
doing (and can be blamed if 
their decisions turn out to be 
unpopular or hurtful).
Programme specialists may make 
politically unpopular choices. 
And/or they may make self-
interested choices which hurt 
effectiveness whilst protecting 
service providers (themselves). 
May also incentivise budget 
holders to pad their budgets so 
that there will be ‘fat’ to be cut 
next time round.
Efficiency gains Sounds less threatening/more 
technical (‘doing more with 
less’). So it may be claimed that 
savings can be made without 
too much pain.
1. Usually requires considerable 
innovation – organisational 
and technological changes 
which may not work, or may 
not work for some time.
2. Probably will not yield enough 
by itself to correct the present 
fiscal imbalances.
Centralised priority-
setting
Looks more strategic and leaves 
politicians directly in control. 
Enables the government to 
protect the most effective 
programmes (if they have 
reliable data on effectiveness)
Ministers become visibly and 
directly responsible for painful 
choices. And, unless they consult 
carefully they may make choices 
with consequences they do 
not fully foresee, but they are 
unlikely to understand the internal 
complexities of the services which 
are being cut.
Source: Pollitt, 2010, p.13
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of the ‘low-hanging fruit’ has been picked. 
The idea that there are still considerable 
quantities of redundancy and waste lying 
around as suitable candidates for cutting-
out seems implausible. The more work 
has already been done, the more the law of 
diminishing returns seems likely to apply. 
Particular issues applying in New Zealand 
(e.g. duplication and costs associated with 
the high level of fragmentation across the 
public sector – dealt with in detail later) 
may be worth attending to. But the general 
point is worth highlighting. The potential 
for significant savings now, relative to the 
aggregate costs of running a government, 
may be fairly marginal. 
A similar point can be made in relation 
to demands for increased productivity. 
Service work is notoriously resistant 
to productivity improvements (see, for 
example, OECD, 2005) but staff ceilings, 
staff reductions and work intensification 
have all been tried (e.g. UK Audit Office, 
2006). With so much work already done 
over recent years, it is unlikely there are 
many undiscovered pockets. Work rates 
are such that staff ceilings usually mean 
high workloads and long hours. Survey 
results of the hours worked by public 
servants in completing their workload 
(e.g., for women, see Proctor-Thomson, 
Donnelly and Plimmer, 2011) suggest little 
capacity for intensification. Attempts 
to push beyond these limits can lead to 
increased sick and stress leave, burn-
out and staff departures (Battaglio and 
Condrey, 2009; Pandey, 2010). Industrial 
strife may also follow, particularly if 
managers and staff perceive that ministers 
have broken the historic bargain that 
characterises organisation in the public 
sphere (Kelman, 2006; Pandey, 2010). 
Moreover, in countries like New Zealand 
a significant amount of operational 
policy work involves servicing the daily 
needs of Cabinet and ministers in their 
executive and parliamentary roles (which 
may explain the recent up-turn in staff 
numbers). Ministers are unlikely to want 
dramatic cutbacks here.
Credibility is one thing but legitimacy 
is another. Difficult economic times like 
those being confronted by the New Zealand 
government demand appropriate fiscal 
responses. The effects of policy cutbacks 
will be negative on some people, possibly 
those least able to afford it or to resist 
(see also Pandey, 2010). Sound evidence – 
or at least plausible reasoning – is needed 
for cutback policies to be accepted as 
legitimate by the electorate even if they 
are unpopular. If communicated openly 
and effectively, voters are likely to accept 
the adjustments for the period of time 
they are required. Cutbacks driven by 
ideology, populism or language games 
(‘bloat’, ‘waste’ and ’bureaucracy’ can be 
seen as ‘boo-hurrah’ words; see Ayer, 1936 
on ‘emotivism’ in language) run the risk 
of not delivering. They may resonate with 
the self-interest of some in the electorate 
but be resented over the longer term by 
public officials themselves, especially 
where previous work has already 
eliminated the inefficiency that once 
existed. Dutiful service to the government 
of the day may continue, but without 
much commitment to performance 
improvement, thereby countering other 
savings strategies. Organisational health 
and future capability matter, and one-off 
savings drives now may cause as much 
damage as benefit. Economy, efficiency 
and productivity are eternal organisational 
values but should be applied as normal 
ways of working and driven from within, 
not occasional bush-beating expeditions 
driven from without.
Innovation
Another catch cry for reforming 
governments is ‘innovation’, based on the 
tacit assumption that it leads to greater 
efficiency and effectiveness (e.g. UK Audit 
Office, 2006). 
Not much is known about how 
innovation occurs in the public sector 
(Hartley, 2005; Pollitt, 2011). It demands 
a willingness to take risks. A degree of 
organisational slack also helps. So does 
an atmosphere of trust, an appetite 
for experimentation and a culture 
of learning. Conversely, budgetary 
constraints, greater work pressures and 
staff lay-offs squeeze out slack, discourage 
risk-taking, lessen trust and reduce the 
tolerance for failure (see Pandey, 2010 
and Pollitt, 2010 for overviews). They 
can also force organisations backwards 
into mechanistic structures and cultures. 
Cuts can also reduce the capacity 
of organisations to provide effective 
and publicly valuable service delivery, 
something that motivates many public 
servants (Pandey, 2010). Pollitt (2011) 
notes that recent expenditure reductions 
imposed on UK local authorities led to 
safeguarding of core services and wiped 
out innovations and recent initiatives. 
Efficiency and innovation are both part 
of public management but, in difficult 
times, achieving one can counteract the 
other.
That said, outcome-oriented public 
officials – those focused most of all on 
achieving good outcomes for clients – 
sometimes continue to innovate, despite 
the system they work in and even when 
resources are constrained: see, for 
example, the cases in Eppel et al., 2008. 
Innovation is risky and most of these 
public entrepreneurs and their fellow 
travellers felt obliged to work under 
the radar in the initial stages. More to 
the point, generalising or scaling up the 
conditions of success they stumbled upon 
or created would most likely be expensive 
in the setting-up and developing stages 
at least. It would be courageous guardian 
angels (senior managers) who would 
approve and authorise such arrangements 
while cost structures are under pressure. 
In short, genuine innovation does occur, 
but is not motivated by or likely to lead 
to significant savings – in the short term, 
anyway.
In fact, innovations in service 
delivery are being touted elsewhere as 
Efficiency and innovation are both part of public 
management but, in difficult times, achieving one 
can counteract the other.
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potential cost savers, not via competition, 
contestability and contracting but 
something very different. Explicit signs 
of this are apparent in Britain in talk 
of localism, mutualism and social 
enterprise underpinning the Conservative 
government’s ‘Big Society’ agenda, as well 
as notions such as co-production and 
‘radical efficiency’ (Boyle and Harris, 
2009; Gillison, Horne and Baeck, 2010; 
see also Hartley, 2005 for a wider view). 
These ideas surfaced first in ‘Third Way’ 
approaches to governing (Giddens, 1994) 
adopted by the Blair Labour government. 
Such creations may achieve two purposes 
at one stroke. The total call on public 
resources (government expenditure 
relative to GDP) could be reduced by 
relying more on civic resources (social 
and human capital) to achieve mandated 
policy goals: in short, more community-
based governance. In this respect, work 
on ‘radical efficiency’ (e.g. Gillison, Horne 
and Baeck, 2010) and ‘co-production’ (e.g. 
Boyle and Harris, 2009; see also other 
work emanating from the new economics 
foundation) is interesting, although 
possibly overblown, particularly in 
relation to the potential savings. Equally, 
community bonds would be strengthened 
and the new governing arrangements 
legitimated by a citizenry participating 
in the creation and maintenance of those 
arrangements. 
These are attractive ideas if only 
because they might expand the realm 
of citizen participation in the policy 
process (Bovaird, 2007; Stoker, 2007). 
If not undertaken adequately, however, 
they would result in massive cost-shifting 
from the polity to civil society. To 
ensure this does not occur, governments 
would need to facilitate and fund the 
extensive capacity-building needed in 
non-government organisations and civil 
society (already becoming apparent 
in Britain: e.g. Young Foundation, 
2010), to say nothing of the extensive 
reconfiguration of public organisations, 
public management practices and the 
skills and capabilities of the public officials 
expected to do that work. Needless to 
say, the level of expenditure required 
over time to achieve this goal would be 
high. The long-term social, political and 
economic benefits may be considerable 
but so would the short-term costs.
Mergers
If cost reductions are the question, mergers 
might also be part of the answer. However, 
this is a difficult issue fraught with risks. 
High human, financial, capability and 
industrial costs can follow mergers such 
that wise governments are inclined to 
avoid them (OECD, 2005) – as the present 
government seems to recognise (English, 
2011). 
The simple fact is, though, that New 
Zealand is in a bind. As noted above, 
government is looking askance at the 
number of separate organisations in 
the public sector, recognising that there 
are many more than in comparable 
countries (English, 2010). A priori, high 
levels of fragmentation and separation 
probably mean more different corporate 
and common service units, information 
systems, senior managers and chief 
executives and the like than are otherwise 
required (or available) to run a public 
sector the size of New Zealand’s. 
The organisational and strategic 
barriers created by these silos, and hence 
the costs involved in negotiating them, 
have been acknowledged in New Zealand 
for over a decade (MAG, 2001; see also 
Schick, 1996). The costs associated with 
achieving strategic, cross-government 
solutions (and the costs to clients 
traversing them in accessing services) 
would presumably be higher than would 
be the case in non-fragmented systems. 
However unpalatable it may seem, there 
might seem to be a prima facie case for 
significant mergers, particularly those that 
reconnect implementation and policy, 
perhaps to as few as 10–15 ‘portfolios’. 
Government has already undertaken 
some minor work in this area and plans 
to do more. Work is presently being 
undertaken in central agencies, although, 
at the time of writing, the directions of 
thinking are unknown outside the small 
groups involved.
Even on this point there is a ‘but’. 
There is no guarantee that mergers in and 
of themselves will produce major savings 
in the short-term anyway; in fact, there 
are some suspicions that any savings 
may be only trivial (and the break-even 
point well into the future). The direct 
costs associated with mergers can be very 
significant, to say nothing of indirect and 
consequential costs, downtime, loss of 
morale and reduced productivity over 
the time that organisations are being 
combined. Further, lack of co-operation 
and collaboration in the public sector are 
just as evident within some organisations 
(between, say, branches or units) as 
they are between organisations; mergers 
might therefore internalise the problems 
of fragmentation without necessarily 
solving them. Anyway, assuming that 
organisations represent necessary and/or 
desired government functions, these still 
have to be conducted regardless of the 
particular configuration of the machinery 
of government. If core activities still need 
to be funded, then the only current costs 
that might be saved are those arising 
out of dealing with fragmentation when 
attempting to integrate and create whole-
of-government solutions. These may 
be significant, but not of the order that 
government apparently wants.
Mergers, however, could be an old-
fashioned solution. It is likely that 
There is no guarantee that mergers in and of 
themselves will produce major savings in the short-
term anyway; in fact, there are some suspicions that 
any savings may be only trivial (and the break-even 
point well into the future).
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public sectors in the future will be more 
like complex adaptive systems based 
on web-like structures and processes, 
rather than (at best) centre-line systems 
build on cybernetic principles as at 
present (Bovaird, 2008). If so, mergers 
in the future might be less essential 
than creating integrative, collaborative 
mechanisms that combine not just levels 
of government and multiple public 
sector organisations under collective, 
whole-of-government goals, but also the 
multitude of community and private 
sector organisations involved in policy 
development and implementation. In 
other words, the future is likely to be the 
world of ‘governance’ being discussed by 
some leading-edge public management 
writers (e.g. Kooiman, 2003; Rhodes, 
1997). But these ideas are still only ‘ideas’. 
Notwithstanding their emergence from 
practice, their constituent theories, 
concepts, models and tools are still 
hugely underdeveloped. The work 
required to bring them to fruition would 
be enormous and extend well into the 
future. They do not stand, therefore, as 
answers to immediate fiscal concerns.
Moreover, New Zealand would 
face particular challenges in moving 
in these directions. The legislative and 
conventional underpinnings of our public 
management system are founded on 
divided ministerial responsibilities, single, 
vertical organisations and competition. 
The foundational changes required to 
move to a collaborative governance future 
would be very considerable indeed and 
would require more, not less, government 
expenditure. This is not an argument 
for not thinking in those terms, but for 
recognising the nature and extent of the 
challenges involved. 
Conclusion
When times are tough there is every reason 
to explore all options for controlling 
public sector expenditure. Options should 
be weighed up, however, against evidence 
of the impacts, positive and negative, non-
economic as well as economic, over time, 
of previous efforts. It is not a time for 
falling into well-known traps, especially 
not for presenting simple ideological 
or theoretical preferences as historical 
necessities. Any elected government is 
perfectly entitled to pursue its perceived 
mandate, but only if there is active public 
awareness and acceptance (ex ante or ex 
post) of the range of possible impacts 
of doing so. Ultimately, if the goal of 
savings as a response to difficult times 
is not achieved and budget austerity 
persists beyond the original forecasts, 
then the government would have failed, 
public sector capability might be reduced 
even more, and citizens would know it. 
They could then vote the government 
out of office at the next election, but the 
institutions of government as much as any 
particular party would also suffer some 
level of damage. Legitimacy regarding 
state institutions is declining amongst 
citizens anyway (OCED 2001) and should 
not be exacerbated. As Pollitt (2011) notes, 
these are matters to be weighed up as part 
of the ethics of reform when considering 
the balance between the costs of governing 
and the ability to govern.
That said, the state of public 
management research at this stage is 
such that it offers only general lessons 
for decision makers. More needs to 
be known. What is known, however – 
and this article has only scratched the 
surface – provides grounds for caution. 
Often, perhaps usually, when controlling 
public sector operating expenditure, 
matters are much more complex than 
the proponents of cutback or reform 
and enthusiastic advocates of ‘new ways’ 
make out, and unintended or unforeseen 
outcomes can outweigh any benefits 
achieved. As Pandey (2010, p.568) argues, 
‘cutback management needs to embrace 
a holistic and long-term perspective 
and defy the pressures to succumb to 
reductionist measures’. The challenges 
confronting governments and senior 
officials in difficult economic times are 
enormous. How best to constrain in the 
short term whilst not undermining what 
may lie ahead? How to keep a reasonable 
balance between fiscal and governance 
goals? More research might help, but wise 
and thoughtful heads will be even more 
important.
1 My thanks to Derek Gill and Chris Eichbaum for comments 
on an earlier draft. 
2 http://www.treasury.govt.nz/statesector/
policyexpenditurereview.
3 This press release says ‘New Zealand currently has 39 
government departments’, but the State Services Commission 
website as at 1 July 2011 shows 32 departments, including 
the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority. There are 
four non-public service agencies: Police, Defence, the 
Security Intelligence Service and Parliamentary Counsel. The 
Office of the Clerk and Parliamentary Services are outside the 
public service. This totals 38 organisations, but only 32 are 
departments and ministries. My thanks to Judy Whitcombe 
for the confirmation.
4 http://www.ssc.govt.nz/pif.
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